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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1990, the Town of Springdale adopted the Uniform 
Fire Code ("UFC") and Tables III of the UFC. (R. 645, 11. 
20-23). 
Section 10.301© of the UFC gives the Fire Chief almost 
unlimited discretion to determine the water flow and the 
number of hydrants for any building he approves. It also 
allows the Fire Chief to use Tables III-A and III-B to set 
fire hydrant requirements. See §10.301© of the UFC attached 
to Appellants Brief as Exhibit "C". 
Fire Chief Bench ("Bench") elected to use Tables III-A and 
III-B for cross-appellee's fire hydrant requirements of 
2,750 g.p.m. from three fire hydrants, (R.656, 11. 2-13) 
and never used his discretion to raise Table III-A water 
flow requirements. (R. 658, 11. 13-15). 
On July 13, and again on August 15, 1991, Bench placed a 
red-tag on cross-appellee's building for among other things 
not providing adequate water flow from cross-appellee's fire 
hydrant system. (R. 49). 
On November 1, 1991, Bench conducted a water flow test to 
determine if cross-appellee's fire hydrant system met the 
requirements of Table III-A of the UFC, and reported the 
results of the test in a letter dated December 10, 1991. 
(R. 63) . 
The November 1, 1991, test showed that the fire hydrant 
system water flowed 3,210 gpm. However, Bench claimed the 
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results of the test showed that the system was not adequate 
for safe fire fighting capabilities because the test showed 
that hydrant #3 had only 1/090 g.p.m. water flow available 
to it. Id. 
Before Bench would lift the red-tag from cross-appellee's 
building, he required that the petitioner make inoperative 
it's #3 fire hydrant and 200 feet of supply line. (R. 49 
15 and R. 67). 
The #3 fire hydrant was placed in a location that not only 
provided needed fire protection to Petitioner's new 
building, but was also placed in that location to provide 
fire protection for a new motel building that was planned. 
(R. 49 16). 
On June 10, 1992, cross-appellee filed a Rule 65B Petition 
seeking extraordinary relief (Civil No. 920500615CV) to 
review the November 1, 1991, test results and determine if 
the results show that the fire hydrant system is not 
adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities. (R. 78) 
On July 1, 1992, the cross appellee filed an Amended 
Petition for extraordinary relief. Id. 
On August 31, 1993, cross-appellee filed a Second Amended 
Rule 65(B) Petition for extraordinary relief listing 
Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District as Respondent. 
The petition alleged that Bench abused his discretion when 
he found that the November 1, 1991, water flow results 
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showed that the hydrant system was not adequate for safe 
fire fighting capabilities. (R. 49 17 and 78). 
On December 15, 1993, the cross-appellant filed a Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Civil No. 920500615CV), 
wherein on page 4 he said "If the aggrieved party is still 
adamant about seeking review of a Fire Chief's decision, the 
aggrieved party may file for extraordinary relief under Rule 
65B in a District Court to have the fire Chief's decision 
reviewed." (R. 69-71). 
On January 7, 1994, the cross-appellant filed a Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, wherein on pages 
3-4 he said "this Court should inquire whether the Fire 
Chief abused his discretion." (R. 73-76). 
On March 9, 1994, the trial court in finding the "Fire 
District" was not a proper party to the action, said "it is 
within the exclusive discretion of the Fire Chief to decide 
finally how the Fire Code will be applied in any particular 
case and it is his discretion which would be subject to 
review under Rule 65B, not the advisory opinion of the Fire 
Board." The court dismissed the Petition with prejudice. 
(Emphasis added) (R. 78-79). 
On March 19, 1994, the cross-appellee filed among other 
things a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement. (R. 82). 
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16. On May 9, 1994, oral argument came before the trial court 
and Paul G. McMillin, filed a Minute Entry that reads as 
follows: 
"(4:22) This case is before Judge J. Philip Eves for hearing 
on Petitioner's Motion for Clarification, Alter or Amend 
Judgment and leave to Amend Petition. . . . Mr. Stirba is 
heard in response, indicates that the case has already been 
decided, and Mr. West either appeal or file a new case. . 
. . Mr. West's Motion to Amend for extraordinary relief is 
denied. If he so desires, Mr. West is to file a claim 
against Al Bench, but it must be a new and separate case if 
he wants further relief. . . . (emphasis added) (R. 82) . 
17. On May 10, 1994, the cross-appellee followed the direction 
of the court and filed a new Petition for extraordinary 
relief (Civil No. 940500723CV) listing Al Bench, as former 
Fire Chief, as Respondent. (R. 1-3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. CROSS-APPEAL 
Before Bench would remove two red-tags from cross-appellee's 
building, he required cross-appellee's #3 fire hydrant and 200 
feet of supply line to be made inoperative because he claimed 
that the November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that the fire 
hydrant system was not adequate for safe fire fighting 
capabilities as long as hydrant #3 was operative. (R. 2, 15). 
A case becomes moot when the judicial relief requested cannot 
affect the rights of the litigants. Bennion v. Sundance 
Development Corporation, 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995). Table 
III-B of the UFC gives the cross-appellee the right to have three 
or more fire hydrants to protect his building. Cross-appellee 
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installed four fire hydrants around his building. Four hydrants 
equally spaced around a building give more protection than three 
hydrants. The cross-appellee paid a considerable amount of money 
for hydrant #3 and 200 feet of supply line for protection of its 
new 12,000 square foot building and cross-appellee has a right 
to have and to use that added fire protection. Therefore, there 
is an actual controversy between the parties and the case is not 
moot. 
On June 10, 1992, cross-appellee filed a Rule 65(B) Petition 
seeking extraordinary relief (Civil No. 920500615CV) to review 
the November 1, 1991, test results. (R. 78). On March 9, 1994, 
the trial court dismissed this cause of action with prejudice 
holding the Fire District was not the proper party to the action, 
stating, 
"it is within the exclusive discretion of the Fire Chief 
to decide finally how the Fire Code will be applied in any 
particular case and it is his discretion which would be 
subject to review under 65B, not the advisory opinion of the 
Fire Board." (emphasis added)(R. 78-79). 
On March 19, 1994, among other things the cross-appellee 
made a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement. (R. 50, 512 and R. 
82). On May 9, 1994, in the courts Minute Entry the court denied 
this motion and said, 
"If he so desires, Mr. West is to file a claim against Al 
Bench, but it must be a new and separate case if [he] wants 
further relief." (R. 82). 
The court directed the cross-appellee to file a new Petition with 
Bench listed as the Respondent. The next day on May 10, 1994, 
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the cross-appellee followed the direction of the court and filed 
a new Petition for extraordinary relief (Civil No. 940500723CV) 
listing Al Bench, as former Fire Chief, as Respondent. (R. 1-3) . 
The cross-appellant argues that an appeal of the courts 
ruling denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement 
would have been a plain, adequate and speedy remedy within the 
meaning of Utah R. CIV. P. 65B(a) and therefore, the cross-
appellee placed itself out of the reach of an extraordinary writ 
when it did not file an appeal. However, an appeal under these 
circumstances would not have been a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy at law within the meaning of Utah R. CIV. P. 65B(a), 
because it was faster, and less expensive to follow the Court's 
direction and file a new action. Furthermore, both the 
Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Bench should have been 
named as Respondent rather than the Fire District. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CROSS-APPEAL 
A. THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE PETITION ARE NOT MOOT THEREFORE, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE CROSS-
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE CASE 
WAS MOOT. 
In an effort to open its new restaurant the cross-appellee 
made the #3 fire hydrant and its 200 feet of supply line 
inoperative as directed to do so by Bench. The fact that 
Petitioner is currently in compliance with the Uniform Fire Code 
is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not petitioner's claims 
are moot, because the cross-appellee claimed that it's fire 
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protection system was in compliance with the Uniform Fire Code 
prior to making its #3 fire hydrant inoperative. (R. 2 at $4) . 
A case becomes moot when the judicial relief requested 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants. Bennion v. Sundance 
Development Corporation, 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995). If in 
fact Bench "abused his discretion" when he found that the 
November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that the fire hydrant 
system was not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities, then 
cross-appellee in fact loses his right to use his #3 fire hydrant 
and 200 feet of supply for fire protection. Table III-B of the 
UFC gives the cross-appellee the right to have three or more fire 
hydrants to protect his building. Cross-appellee installed four 
fire hydrants around his building. Four hydrants equally spaced 
around a building give more protection than three hydrants. The 
cross-appellee paid a considerable amount of money for hydrant 
#3 and 200 feet of supply line for protection of its new 12,000 
square foot building and cross-appellee has a right to have and 
to use that added fire protection. Therefore, there is an actual 
controversy between the parties. 
The cross-appellant argues, 
"Of utmost importance to this issue is the fact that Al 
Bench is no longer the Fire Chief or Fire Marshall. 
Therefore, any order directing him to perform any action 
would have no effect and as he is no longer in any position 
of authority. Moreover, the Fire Protection District under 
which Al Bench served as Fire Chief is not a party to the 
action below." 
However, the Rule 65B Petition for extraordinary relief filed by 
cross-appellee did not ask the court to direct Bench or the Fire 
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District to do anything. Concerning the issues before it, the 
court said, 
THE COURT: "Once again let me explain what I view as the 
issues. And I'm taking these directly from the petitioner's 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief. To determine if the 
water flow test conducted on November [1], 1991, showed that 
the petitioner's fire protection system did not comply with 
Table A III-A(l) . . . . Number two, to determine if the 
test showed that the system was not adequate . . . safe fire 
fighting capabilities. And number three, to specify 
specifically whether hydrant three was a dangerous hydrant." 
(R. 922-923) . 
If the court found that Bench had abused his discretion in 
finding that the test results showed that the system was unsafe, 
there wouldn't be anything that Bench or the Fire District needed 
to do to make the #3 fire hydrant operative. 
B. THE CROSS-APPELLEE DID NOT HAVE ANOTHER PLAIN, ADEQUATE AND 
SPEEDY REMEDY. 
On June 10, 1992, cross-appellee filed a Rule 65(B) Petition 
seeking extraordinary relief (Civil No. 920500615CV) to review 
the November 1, 1991, test results. (R. 78) On March 9, 1994, 
the trial court dismissed this cause of action with prejudice 
holding among other things that, 
"it is within the exclusive discretion of the Fire Chief to 
decide finally how the Fire Code will be applied in any 
particular case and it is his exercise of discretion which 
would be subject to review under Rule 65B, not the advisory 
opinion of the Fire Board. . . Accordingly, the Petition 
is ordered dismissed upon the alternative ground that the 
Respondent, [Rockville-Springdale Fire Protection District] 
is not a proper party to the action." (emphasis added)(R. 
78-80). 
On March 19, 1994, among other things the cross-appellee 
made a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement. (R.50, 512 and R. 82). 
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On May 9, 1994, in the court's Minute Entry the court denied this 
motion and said, 
"If he so desires, Mr. West is to file a claim against Al 
Bench, but it must be a new and separate case if [he] wants 
further relief." (R. 82). 
The court directed the cross-appellee to file a new Petition with 
Bench listed as the Respondent. The next day on May 10, 1994, 
the cross-appellee followed the direction of the court and filed 
a new Petition for extraordinary relief (Civil No. 940500723CV) 
listing Al Bench, as former Fire Chief, as Respondent. (R. 1-3) . 
The cross-appellant argues that an appeal of the courts 
ruling denying Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgement 
would have been a plain, adequate and speedy remedy within the 
meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) and therefore, the cross-
appellee placed itself out of the reach of an extraordinary writ 
when it did not file an appeal. This argument is in direct 
conflict with what the cross-appellant argued on December 15, 
1993, January 7, 1994, and on May 9, 1994. On December 15, 1993, 
the cross-appellant filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, arguing that the Fire District was not a proper party 
to the action, (Civil No. 920500615CV), wherein on page 4 he 
said, 
"If the aggrieved party is still adamant about seeking 
review of a Fire Chief's decision, the aggrieved party may 
file for extraordinary relief under Rule 65B in a District 
Court to have the Fire Chief's decision reviewed." (R. 69-
71). 
On January 7, 1994, the cross-appellant filed a Reply Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss, wherein on page 3-4 he said, 
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"this Court should inquire whether the Fire Chief abused his 
discretion." (R. 73-76). 
On May 9, 1994, oral argument came before the trial court and 
Paul G. McMillin, filed a Minute Entry that reads as follows: 
"(4:22) This case is before Judge J. Philip Eves for hearing 
on Petitioner's Motion for Clarification, Alter or Amend 
Judgment and leave to Amend Petition. . . . Mr. Stirba is 
heard in response, indicates that the case has already been 
decided, and Mr. West either appeal or file a new case. . 
. . (emphasis added)(R. 82) 
There is little doubt that the cross-appellee could have 
appealed the courts ruling. However, an appeal under these 
circumstances would not have been a plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy at law within the meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), 
becuase it was faster, and less expensive to follow the Court's 
direction and file a new action. Furthermore, both the 
Petitioner and Respondent agreed that Bench should have been 
named as Respondent rather than the Fire District. 
C. RELIEF UNDER RULE 65B(e) CAN BE GRANTED WHERE AN 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL 
FUNCTIONS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, OR WHERE A PERSON HAS 
FAILED TO PERFORM AN ACT REQUIRED BY LAW AS A DUTY OF 
OFFICE, TRUST OR STATION, OR AND WHERE A PERSON HAS REFUSED 
THE PETITIONER THE USE OR ENJOYMENT OF A RIGHT TO WHICH THE 
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED. UTAH R. CIV. P. 65B(e) (2) (A) , 
(B)&(C). 
1. RULE 65B(e) (2) (A). 
The court had the authority to review the Chief's decision 
because it is the act of an administrative agency and the cross-
appellee alleges that the administrative agency's fire chief has 
abused his discretion. 
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2. Rule 65b(e)(2)(B) and (C). 
In March 1990, the Town of Springdale adopted the Uniform 
Fire Code and Table III of the UFC. (R. 645, 11. 20-23). The 
Fire Chief enforces the Uniform Fire Code to make sure any fire 
hydrant system is in compliance with the water flow and number 
of fire hydrants required by the Chief and/or Table III-A and 
III-B of the UFC. See §10.301 (C) of the UFC attached to 
Petitioner's Brief as Exhibit T', Fire Chief Bench elected to 
use Tables III-A and III-B for cross-appellee's fire hydrant 
requirements of 2,750 g.p.m. out of three hydrants, (R. 656, 11. 
2-13) and never used his discretion to raise Table III-A 
requirements. (R. 658, 11. 13-15). The results of the water flow 
test conducted on November 1, 1991, showed that the cross-
appellee's hydrant system water flowed 3,210 g.p.m. (R. 63), 
which is 450 g.p.m. more than what is required by Table III-A of 
the UFC. Therefore, the cross-appellee's system was in 
compliance with the UFC. If the system could be used with safety 
with hydrant #3 operative, the fire chief had a duty to approve 
the system, and the cross-appellee had a right to use its system. 
The cross-appellee paid a considerable amount of money for 
hydrant #3 and 200 feet of supply line. Therefore, cross-
appellee has a right to have and to use that added fire 
protection which hydrant #3 provided. 
Chief Bench abused his discretion when he found that the 
November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that the system was not 
adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities with hydrant #3 
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operative, because his determination was not supported by a 
reasonable basis. See Argument Issue I, Petitioner/Appellant 
Brief pages 14-24. 
D. THE REVIEW SOUGHT BY PETITIONER WAS WITHIN THE SCOPE 
CONTEMPLATED BY RULE 65B. 
On November 1, 1991, Bench conducted a water flow test to 
determine if cross-appellee's fire hydrant system met the 
requirements of Table III-A of the UFC, and reported the results 
of the test in a letter dated December 10, 1991. (R. 63). The 
test showed that the fire hydrant system water flowed 3,210 
g.p.m., 460 g.p.m. more than what Table III-A of the UFC 
requires. Id. However, Bench still claimed the results of the 
test showed that the system was not adequate for safe fire 
fighting capabilities. Id. 
When reviewing the Fire Chief's discretionary decisions, his 
findings of fact will be "accorded substantial deference and will 
not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if 
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Hurley v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 
(Utah 1988). The cross-appellee's Rule 65B Petition asked the 
court to review the Fire Chief's decision which was based on the 
test results found in Bench's letter dated December 10, 1991, to 
determine whether or not the November 1, 1991, test results would 
support the finding that petitioner's system was not adequate for 
safe fire fighting capabilities. (R. 2-3) . The Hurley standard 
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of review as stated above can certainly be applied to the relief 
sought. 
In conclusion. For the reasons set forth above, the Fifth 
District Court did not err in denying respondents Motion to 
Dismiss. 
E. EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXPRESS STATUTORY PROCEDURE, 
PETITIONER HAS A RIGHT OF REVIEW IMPLEMENTED THROUGH SECTION 
5 OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH VESTS 
GENERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Even in the absence of any express statutory procedure. 
Petitioner has a right of review implemented through Section 5 
of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution which vests general 
appellate jurisdiction in the District Court. Peatross v.Board 
of Corners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah). 
ARGUMENT 
II. IN RESPONSE TO CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF. 
A. UNDER THE UNIFORM FIRE CODE, THE FIRE CHIEF IS GIVEN 
BROAD DISCRETION IN ADMINISTERING AND ENFORCING THE 
UFC. 
The cross-appellee concedes Section 10.301© of the UFC gives 
the Fire Chief almost unlimited discretion to determine the water 
flow and the number of hydrants for any building he approves. 
However, John Elder, the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of 
the State Fire Marshal's Office of the State of Utah, 
acknowledged that the fire chief would need to be able to justify 
his decisions based on a rational basis. (R. 860) 
Bench was asked by his attorney to explain to the Court what 
factors he relied on in reaching his conclusions set out in his 
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December 10, 1991, report. He answered, (1) he considered the 
experience of his fire fighters and found that their experience 
and training were minimal; (2) he considered his equipment which 
was very old and probably had seen better years; (3) he 
considered the fact that the surrounding area, and petitioner's 
building is located probably in the most congested part of town; 
(4) he considered the hydrants on the other side of the street 
that the town water superintendent had told him from "day one" 
were very poor hydrants that could not be trusted; (5) he 
considered the Bed and Breakfast with wood-shingles next door; 
(6) he considered the "mutual aid" companies that were at his 
disposal; and, (7) he considered other various factors. (R. 938-
941) . All these factors were known by Bench when he used his 
discretion and elected to use Tables III-A and III-B of the UFC 
to set petitioner's requirements at 2,750 gallons per minute 
from a minimum of three hydrants. (R. 656, 11.2-13). Bench 
testified that he never used his discretion to raise the water 
flow requirements of Table III-A. (R 658, 11. 13-15) . 
Furthermore, Bench testified that he ever required 1,000 gpm out 
of hydrant #2 and #3 until December 10, 1991 which was over a 
year from when the hydrants were installed. (R. 672, 11. 1-22) . 
B. THE EVIDENCE RELIED ON BY BENCH IN REACHING HIS 
CONCLUSIONS SET OUT IN HIS DECEMBER 10, 1991 LETTER 
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE OR RATIONAL BASIS. 
The cross-appellant listed the following evidence relied on 
by Bench and presented to the court: 
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i. PLACEMENT OF THE HYDRANTS, 
The cross-appellant used two pages to describe the history 
of the placement of the hydrants. However, the placement of the 
hydrants were not relevant to the issues which were before the 
court. The court said, "the exact history of Mr. West's disputes 
with Springdale officials is not relevant to the issues before 
the court." See Memorandum Decision attached to appellant brief 
as Exhibit "D" page one. Concerning the issues before it, the 
court said, 
"Once again let me explain what I view as the issues. And 
I'm taking these directly from the petitioner's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. To determine if the water flow test 
conducted on November [1], 1991, showed that the 
petitioner's fire protection system did not comply with 
Table A III-A(l) . . . . Number two, to determine if the 
test showed that the system was not adequate . . . safe fire 
fighting capabilities. And number three, to specify 
specifically whether hydrant three was a dangerous hydrant." 
(R. 922-923.) 
ii. WATER FLOW TESTS. 
There was no water flow test taken in March 1991 as claimed 
by cross-appellant on page 26 of its brief, the first water flow 
test was conducted on July 2, 1991, by John Elder. The cross-
appellant claims that the water flow test made by John Elder 
showed that there was insufficient flow to the hydrants, and that 
the results of the test indicated that there were only 1,800 
gallons per minute flowing from the two hydrants and that there 
was a needed flow of 2,750 to 3,000 gallons per minute. Id. at 
pp 26-27. However, it is not true that hydrant #2 and #3 needed 
to flow 2,700 to 3,000 gallons per minute. The July 2, 1991, 
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water flow test was not made to determine if the two hydrants met 
the water flow required by Table III-A of the UFC, it was made 
to determine if hydrant #3 was dry or its water flow 
insignificant, and if the test showed hydrant #3fs water flow was 
insignificant then the cross-appellee would be required to "loop 
his system." See Elder's letter dated January 27, 1991, 
attached to Petitioner's Brief as Exhibit "E". Table III-A and 
III-B require 2,750 g.p.m. out of three hydrants not two, and 
this is why hydrant #1 was installed, and was tested on July 12, 
1991, to determine if the system complied with Table III-A. 
After the July 2, 1991, test was conducted, Elder did not order 
the petitioner to provide a "looped system," and agreed that 
when hydrant #1 was installed, it was no longer necessary to 
loop the system. (R. 854, 11. 1-13). 
The cross-appellant quotes extensively from John Elder in 
an effort to show that Elder's testimony supports the court's 
finding that, 
"[T]he court is persuaded by the testimony of . . . John 
Thorpe Elder, . . . that the fire system design installed 
by Mr. West created a substantial hazard because hydrants 
two and three (both on the 6-inch line), is used 
simultaneously, could not produce adequate fire flow to 
support fire fighters . . . See Memorandum Decision 
attached to appellant's brief as Exhibit "D" page 7. 
(emphasis added). 
However, Elder testified that he did know what Bench took 
into consideration in exercising his discretion, and that 
he did not have the expertise to venture an opinion as to 
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whether the petitioner's hydrant system was safe. The transcript 
reads, 
THE COURT: "As you know of the situation, are you able to 
say what he exercised or what he took into consideration in 
exercising his discretion?" ELDER: "I'm not your Honor/7 
THE COURT: "Okay. Also there's an allegation in this 
lawsuit that the fire hydrant number three was an unsafe 
hydrant— or that it was not an unsafe hydrant even though 
apparently the chief had determined that it was. . . Are you 
— do you have expertise to venture an opinion on that?" 
ELDER: "No". (R. 864, 11. 9-21). 
If Elder has no expertise to venture an opinion whether the 
petitioner's hydrant system was safe, there should be no question 
that the court could not use the testimony of Elder, to support 
its finding that Bench relied on credible supporting evidence in 
making his determination that the two fire hydrants on the six-
inch dead end line created a system that is not adequate for safe 
fire fighting. 
Bench said his concerns about the petitioner's system was 
based on the fact, 
"that with only 1,100 gallons available to both of those 
hydrants at 20 PSI, that it's an either/or situation. Once 
you put a pumper on each of those, it becomes . . . a very 
dangerous situation." . . . (R. 717, 11. 8-12) 
However, the results of the November 1, 1991, flow test will 
not support bench's claim that hydrant #2 and #3 cannot water 
flow more than 1,100 gpm collectively with hydrant #1 closed. 
Because, Tandy and Mertens both agree, that without performing 
a field test or running a computer simulated test, you can't 
determine the available water flow from hydrant #2 and #3 
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collectively or individually, with hydrant #1 closed or 
restricted to less than 2,120 g.p.m.1 When Bench was asked if he 
had ever run a water flow test to determine what the back two 
hydrants would water flow at 20 psi with hydrant #1 closed, he 
admitted that he had not. (R. 547, 11. 6-11). Therefore, the 
results of the November 1, 1991, flow test furnishes no evidence 
that will support Bench's claim. If Bench was concerned what 
hydrant #2 and #3 could water flow collectively with hydrant #1 
closed, he should have designed such a test. 
Bench stated over and over and over again that hydrants #2 
and #3 could not water flow more than 1,100 g.p.m. collectively.2 
However, when Bench was asked if he could determine from the 
results of the water flow test conducted on November 1, 1991, the 
water flow from hydrant #3, if hydrant #1 was closed, he 
answered, "NO". (R. 720, 1. 23 to 721, 11.14). Therefore, this 
proves conclusively that Bench's conclusion that hydrants #2 and 
#3 couldn't flow more than 1,100 g.p.m., with hydrant #1 closed, 
is not supported by a reasonable basis. See ARGUMENT, ISSUE I., 
POINT B. Petitioner/Appellant Brief page 24-28. 
1. SEE (R. 886, 11, 8-12);(R. 897, 11. 16-23);(R. 612, 1. 12 to 
613, 1. 11). 
2. See (R. 546, 1. 15 to p. 547, 1. 5)[only 1,100 g.p.m. 
available];R. 690, 11. 8-12)[only 1,100 g.p.m. available]; (R. 
717, 11. 8-18)[only 1,100 g.p.m. available]; (R. 721, 11. 9-
11). 
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iii. APPEALS BOARDS. 
The cross-appellee appealed Bench's claim that hydrant #3fs 
water flow was not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities 
to two Boards of Appeals. Bench lied to both boards when he told 
them that hydrant #3fs water flow was so insufficient that it 
would never register on his test equipment. (R. 112. Pla 202 and 
Pla 203). The cross-appellant admits that Bench testified before 
the board that he couldn't get a reading on hydrant number three. 
On page 33 of its brief it says, 
"Before the board, the then Chief Bench testified that 
he couldn't get a reading on hydrant number three. R.00692. 
At the time of the July 12, 1991, test/ the then Chief Bench 
said in regards to the test, "[i]t really did not move it 
one increment, but we gave [it] the benefit of the 
doubt." R. 00693. After examining all the evidence 
presented, the board chose to uphold the then Chief Bench's 
findings." 
However, the record shows that Bench did not make the statement 
that is underlined during the July 12, 1991, test The record 
reads, 
MULLEN: Mr. Bench, when we broke, you stated that on July 
12, you gave — the benefit of the doubt to the readings you 
took on the Pitot gauge, right? BENCH: Correct. MULLEN: 
Your Honor, at this point, we'd like to play a four-minute 
tape of that test with Mr. Bench calling out the reading of 
the Pitot gauge. . . . MULLEN: Okay. Did you hear that 
phrase there on the tape about the — BENCH: It moved one 
point. MULLEN: It's not the benefit of the doubt there, is 
it? BENCH: I said, "one point" But it did not quite move 
one point. MULLEN: You did not say on that tape "It didn't 
quite move one point," you said, "One point." BENCH: No, 
I did not. No, I did not. MULLEN: One point again, right, 
Mr. Bench? BENCH: That's what I said. MULLEN: Not benefit 
of the doubt, right? BENCH: That's what I said. MULLEN: 
The gauge starts at five, doesn't it? BENCH: As I remember 
that gauge, it does start at five. MULLEN: So to move it 
one point gets it up to 6, right? BENCH: That's my 
19 
understanding of the gauge at the time. MULLEN: And if we 
were to look at Exhibit 94, the handwritten notes we saw on 
Monday, we'd see that you gave that hydrant there a six, 
right? BENCH: I assigned it a value of six MULLEN: 
Now, Mr. Bench, isn't it true you told the board of appeals 
on July 18th — . . six days after this — that you could 
not even get hydrant number three to give you a reading to 
measure on your instruments? BENCH: I don't remember what 
my exact words were. . . . MULLEN: Okay, Your Honor. We 
have another tape, then. . . . MULLEN: Okay. That was your 
voice there — "it did not measure on our readings: — 
right? BENCH: — yes. . . MULLEN: And on that test, you 
got a measurement of six on your Pitot gauge? BENCH: I think 
we just saw me state six. MULLEN: That's right. So it did 
register on the Pitot gauge — on your instruments on July 
12, didn't it?. . . BENCH: Yes, it did. (R. 694-706). 
The Cross-appellant made it appear that the underlined statement 
was given to the board of appeals. However, this explanation 
was given to the trial court to cover up his lies to the board 
of appeals concerning his test results. (R. 708). Therefore, 
when the board of appeals chose to uphold Bench's findings, all 
they had was Bench's statement "it did not measure on our 
readings." Supra. 
Bench finally admitted that hydrant #3 measured on his test 
equipment on all of his tests. Mullen asked Bench, 
MULLEN: My question was all the tests you conducted hydrant 
number three registered on the Pitot gauge, didn't it? 
BENCH: I don't remember if it did every one or not. . . Like 
if you take a look at this, it did. It barely did. MULLEN: 
Let's take a look in your deposition, if we can. Would you 
take a look Page 110 in your deposition, . . I'd like you 
to turn and look at . . . Line 24, . . . Q. Which test did 
it move the Pitot gauge? A. It moved the Pitot gauge on all 
three of the tests. (R. 707-708). 
Bench tried to explain to the court why he said that hydrant 
#3 did not measure on his equipment. He said, 
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"And relatively speaking, six on a scale of 200 is not 
bumping the gauge. It was a figurative form of speech that 
I was using to say how insignificant it was. Which I've 
said through the process, that there's insignificant flow. 
. ." (R. 952-953); See also, Appellant's Brief page 33. 
However, if Bench was acting in "good faith" and honestly thought 
that a reading of 6 on the gauge was insufficient for safe fire 
fighting, he would have told the Boards of Appeals that 6 on the 
gauge shows that the hydrant was water flowing 822 gallons per 
minute, and then explained why he thought 822 gallons per minute 
water flow was unsafe. He wouldn't have purposely lied to the 
Board. 
On page 33-34 the cross-appellant quotes Bench as saying, 
"the board members had all the information and numbers in 
front of them. And I gave that same information verbally, 
as I remember it." (emphasis added). 
Based on this claim the cross-appellant went on to say in 
his brief, 
"Contrary to the Petitioner's assertion that Al Bench is 
lying, all data related to pitot gauge readings and flow 
test results were provided to every appeals board and, in 
fact, the water flow did not, or at best barely bumped the 
pitot gauge. The January 30, 1992, board upheld the 
discretion and findings of then Chief Bench." See page 34 
of cross-appellant's brief. 
However, if this Court will listen to Exhibit 202, which is an 
excerpt of the July 18, 1991, board of appeals hearing, you will 
hear Bench being asked to give the board the results of the July 
12, 1991, water flow test he conducted. He said that he could 
not because the water flow from hydrant #3 was so insufficient 
that it would not register on his test equipment. See Trial 
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Exhibit 202. Both boards of appeals upheld Bench's findings, 
that hydrant #3 was unsafe, because he lied to them. He said 
hydrant #3 would not register on his test equipment. Both 
hearings were recorded on video tapes and the cross-appellant has 
copies of them. I challenge the cross-appellant to find where 
Bench "verbally" gave the test results to either board of 
appeals. 
iv. SOLUTIONS OFFERED BY BENCH IN HIS DECEMBER 10, 1991, LETTER 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY A REASONABLE OR RATIONAL BASIS. 
The cross-appellant said the following on page 34 of his 
brief. 
"As of mid-July 1990, Mr. West was aware of 
alternatives that had been suggested to make his system 
safe. In the Chief Bench's December 10, 1991, letter, he 
incorporated the already discussed alternatives and added 
another option. Specifically, the then Chief Bench 
suggested: 
1) Loop the system. 
2) Sprinkle the building. 
3) Increase the size of the six-inch line 
sufficiently to provide 1,000 GPM to each hydrant 
with the #1 hydrant flowing. 
4) Install a hydrant at the mark designated by the 
District in front of the Laundromat and remove 
the #3 hydrant.'' 
1) LOOP THE SYSTEM. 
John Elder is the Chief of the Fire Prevention Bureau of the 
State Fire Marshall's Office of the State of Utah. When Elder 
learned that hydrant #2 and #3 were installed on a six-inch dead 
end supply line, he was concerned whether or not hydrant #3 
22 
would have adequate water to serve a pumper if hydrant #2 
was being used. (R. 814, 1. 8 to 815, 1. 2). 
In a letter dated January 23, 1991, Elder ordered the 
Fire Department to water flow hydrants #2 and #3 to determine the 
available water to hydrant #3 during simultaneous use. He said 
If #3 is dry or the flow is insignificant, then the water line 
will be run to the north and connected to the main line on the 
highway, thus providing a looped system." (emphasis added) See 
Letter attached to Petitioner's Brief Exhibit "E". Elder 
conducted the test he referred to in his letter on July 2, 1991. 
After the test was conducted, Elder did not order the petitioner 
to provide a " looped system," and agreed that when hydrant #1 
was installed, it was "no longer necessary to loop the system." 
(R. 854, 11. 1-13). 
After the flow test was conducted on November 1, 1991, Elder 
was asked by Mayor Robert Ralston of the Town of Springdale, to 
determine from the test results whether the petitioner's hydrant 
system was in compliance with Table III-A of the UFC. In a 
letter dated February 7, 1992, Elder said, 
"It would appear from the documentation sent to us, that if 
2,750 gallons per minute is required for the site, and 2,120 
gallons per minute is available from hydrant number one, 
that only 630 gallons per minute -would be required from 
hydrants two and three collectively. Since 1,090 gallons 
per minute is available from either hydrants two or three, 
it would appear the code requirement of 2,750 gallons per 
minute has been met." (R. 823, 1. 2 to 824, 1. 5) 
(emphasis added) 
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2) SPRINKLE THE BUILDING. 
Bench claims, 
"that with only 1,100 gallons available to both of those 
hydrants at 20 PSI, that it's an either/or situation. Once 
you put a pumper on each of those, it becomes . . . a very 
dangerous situation." . . . (R. 717, 11. 8-12) 
However, a sprinkled building Table III-A of the UFC still 
requires a minimum of 1,500 gallons per minute. Therefore, the 
alleged danger still remains even if the building had been 
sprinkled. Because, one 1,000 gpm rated pumper can pump up to 
1,500 gpm. (R. 897, 11. 10-15)(R. 609, 11. 17-24). 
3) INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE SIX-INCH LINE SUFFICIENTLY TO 
PROVIDE 1,000 GPM TO EACH HYDRANT WITH THE #1 HYDRANT 
FLOWING. 
Bench required all of the cross-appellee's hydrants to 
water flow 1,000 gpm to protect his two 1,000 gpm rated pumpers. 
See Petitioner's Brief, ARGUMENT, ISSUE I. However, 1,000 gpm 
hydrants would not correct the problem because 1,000 gpm rated 
pumpers can water flow up to 1,500 gpm. SUPRA. 
4) INSTALL A HYDRANT AT THE MARK DESIGNATED BY THE DISTRICT IN 
FRONT OF THE LAUNDROMAT AND REMOVE THE #3 HYDRANT. 
If this option was chosen, this would make the dangers worse 
than the dangers alleged by Bench. This is true because of the 
following reasons. 
1. 1,000 gpm rated pumpers can pump up to 1,500 gpm. 
Id. 
2. If hydrant #3 was removed and relocated in front of 
the Laundromat both hydrant #1 and #3 would be 
supplied by the main ten-inch supply line and would 
receive their water before hydrant #2. 
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3. The November 1, 1991, water flow test showed that with 
only two hydrants flowing, hydrant #1 flowing 2,100 
gpm hydrant #3 water flowed 820 gpm. (R. 63). 
4. After relocating hydrant #3, if there were two 1,000 
gpm rated pumpers pumping from hydrant #1 and #3, they 
would be pulling up to 3,000 gpm before hydrant #2 
received its water. 
5. If during the November 1, 1991, hydrant #3 could only 
water flow 820 gpm with hydrant #1 taking 2,100 gpm 
first, then if hydrant #1 and #3 were taking 3,000 gpm 
first, hydrant #2 would be flowing less than 820 gpm 
because it is taking its water last on the six-inch 
dead end supply line. 
v. TWO HYDRANTS ON A SIX-INCH, DEAD-END LINE DO NOT CREATE A 
FIRE HAZARD TO FIRE FIGHTERS IF USED SIMULTANEOUSLY, IF THE 
PROPER TEST WAS TAKEN AND IT WAS SHOWN THAT THERE WAS 
ADEQUATE WATER FLOW. 
On page 35-36 of the Cross-Appellant's Brief he said, John 
Elder, 
"does not allow two hydrants to be placed on a six-inch dead 
end line. This is because of the possibility of not having 
enough water to pump from one hydrant while water is being 
drawn or drafted from the other hydrant. This is one reason 
that Mr. Elder required that Indian Village's system to be 
tested. This is one of the factors that then Chief Bench 
used in determining that the system was inadequate. 
It is true Elder did in fact order the July 2, 1991, water 
flow test to determine if hydrant #3fs water flow was sufficient 
to use when hydrant #2 was flowing. However, Bench could not use 
this fact as a factor in determining that the system was 
inadequate. Because, after the test showed that the two hydrants 
water flowed 1,800 gpm, (R. 501, 11. 1-11) Mr. Elder did not 
order the petitioner to loop his system, and agreed that when 
hydrant #1 was installed it was no longer necessary to loop the 
system. Supra. Whether or not the cross-appellant likes it or 
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not cross-appellee passed Elder's test/ the only test that was 
designed to determine whether the six-inch system was adequate 
for safe fire fighting. (R.547/ 11. 6-11). 
On page 37 of the Cross-Appellant's brief he tries to 
insinuate that Mertens thought that the results of the November 
I, 1991, water flow test as reported in Bench's letter dated 
December 10/ 1991, showed that the water flow would only be able 
to adequately fight a "normal" fire. The cross-appellant 
deliberately took the work "normal" out of context. Actually 
Mertens said the following concerning the results of the November 
1, 1991/ water flow test: 
"Q. Now Mr. Mertens/ if we took the Indian Village system, 
and we considered it to be only these three hydrants/ — 
three, two and one— and excluded the rest of them, based 
on Mr. Bench's calculations for November 1st — 820 gallons 
per minute out of number three at 43 PSI, 2/120 out of 
number one — would these tree hydrants constitute an 
adequate and safe system for fire fighting? A. Yes, It's 
more than adequate without even opening number two and 
without even taking number three down to 20 PSI. This test 
already shows it's adequate." (R. 566, 11. 20 to R. 567/ 
11. 5). . . Q. Okay. Now, the 2,750 gallon requirement that 
the code has in Table III — is that — a minimum amount 
that's necessary? Is that for fighting a large fire or a 
small fire? Can you tell us about that? A. That table has 
been developed from tables over time and represents what you 
would consider the maximum you'd ever need. Because what 
that number figures is that . . your building is completely 
involved. You're using as many hoses on that building to 
surround it as possible. And so it's . . the worst 
condition. Q. . . is there anything you could call a noxTnal 
fire that you might be fighting? A. Yes. It's . . when 
an engine company or fire department shows up at a fire, 
they're normally seeing a fire which is — especially the 
downtown area — is discovered and called in, and they're 
finding that they might have a room involvement, or it may 
have spread to the second room. Q. And can you give us an 
estimate of . . what percentage of the 2,750 gallons per 
minute would be needed to suppress that type of a fire at 
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Indian Village? . . A. I would say that on your response to 
that type of fire, you would be using [no] more than 500 
gallons per minute, (R. 576, 1. 10 to 579, 1. 19). 
On page 35-40 the cross-appellant agues that because, two 
hydrants are on installed on a six-inch dead end line, this 
automatically causes the system to be inadequate without water 
flow testing the system or regardless of what the test results 
show. The trial court asked the following questions to Mr. 
Mertens concerning the hydrants installed on the six-inch dead 
end line: 
"COURT. Assume that you're faced with the circumstances that 
. . when the fire chief comes on the site, he finds this 
system installed in the configuration that you see? A. 
Exactly as installed, I would say that then he would run a 
test just to make sure he delivers 2,750 [gpm] and make sure 
he has sufficient number. And he's overprotected both in 
number and flow. COURT. How does one properly run the test 
to determine whether you have flow of 2,750? A. You can 
open up .. any of the hydrants. And the way it is done is 
if you open up one hydrant, [if] it does not have enough, 
you open up a second hydrant at the same time. And if you 
don't have enough, you open a third hydrant at the same 
time. If you don't have enough in three, you open up a 
fourth hydrant at the same time. COURT: So you draw your 
conclusion that the flow was adequate from the fact that 
while hydrant number one was running, hydrant number three 
was open, and that together they produced more than 2,750 
gallons per minute? A. Yes. I've seen several tests, and 
they've all produced more than 2,750 as a combination. 
Obviously if you only test number two and three alone, then 
you may not get 2,750. But that's not . . how you run the 
test. COURT: All right. (R. 634, 6 to R. 635, 1. 7). 
The following were questions asked by Mr. Hathaway to Mr. 
Mertens concerning the hydrants installed on the six-inch dead-
end line: 
"Q. Are you familiar with the . . fire protection handbook, 
Mr. Mertens? A. Very much so. . . Q. Are you aware that it 
. . cautions against the use of six inch lines, particularly 
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in dead end situations? A. I know what it says about 
that, yes. But [the system] can easily be calculated to 
know what you have. (R. 614, 11. 13-22). Q. Mr. Mertens, 
. . Would you ever design and install a new system that 
consisted of 400 feet of a six-inch diameter line with two 
hydrants on it? A. Yes. There's nothing wrong with it, as 
long as it met the fire flow requirements. Q, . • You 
would consider that to be reasonable under the 
circumstances, in your designing experience? A. 
Absolutely. And that's why I'm going to Madison tomorrow 
and continue teaching how you design for minimum demands 
in order to be able to meet fire flow requirements, and how 
to do that. Q. And you ..consider that to be in your 
prerogative, notwithstanding [that] .. standards or 
recommendations may be out there nationally; correct? A. 
Well . . there's a lot of information . . which is 
considered like old hat kind of — pull out of the air. . 
. What [they're] referring to is . . "Well, I don't know 
what [a six-inch line] is going to do." But we know what 
[this six-inch line] is going to do. And you can calculate 
it, and it's been calculated, and so that all is known. And 
that's why I teach the hydraulic design, so that you know 
what your system is capable of doing." (R. 622, 1. 8 to 623, 
1. 8) . 
The cross-appellant spent four pages quoting from Mr. Tandy 
to show that the trial court could rely on Tandy's testimony 
to support its finding that the court was persuaded by the 
testimony of Mr. Tandy that the fire system designed and 
installed by the petitioner created a substantial hazard. 
However, ALL of Tandy's testimony concerning the court's finding 
has been marshaled and shows that it is based on the testimony 
of Bench that the results of the November 1, 1991, flow test 
showed that only 1,100 gpm is available to hydrants #2 and #3 
collectively with hydrant #1 closed. See Petitioner's Brief 
ARGUMENT POINT I B and C. Tandy testified as follows: 
Mr. MULLEN: Your testimony was — and correct if I'm wrong 
— that you do not know what is going to happen back here 
when this [hydrant 01] is off?" MR. TANDY: "Let me 
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rephrase it. I know that is a potentially lethal situation. 
And if you're pumping from hydrant number three, and you 
have an engine crew come in and begin pumping [at] capacity 
or max capacity from hydrant number two, . . . it will lose 
its pressure and lose its volume to the point where those 
people are in a very life-threatening situation." (R. 900, 
11. 12-22) See also, citations which cover similar 
testimony.1 
However, on cross examination, Tandy testified that he did 
not know what the water flow would be from hydrants #2 and #3 if 
hydrant #1 was closed without pumping from it. Hathaway asked 
Tandy, 
"Now, based on your experience and your flow testing and 
your fire fighting, ' if hydrant number one was shut down, 
would it increase the flow to hydrants number two and 
three?" TANDY: I couldn't say. (R. 886, 11. 8-12); See 
also (R. 897, 11. 16-23) ["Not without pumping It"] . 
In conclusion, Tandy admits he didn't know from the November 
1, 1991, test results what hydrants #2 and #3 would flow with 
hydrant #1 closed without pumping from them. Yet, ALL his 
testimony is based on the assumption that hydrant #2 and #3 are 
incapable of water flowing more than 1,100 gpm with hydrant #1 
closed or flowing less than 2,120 gpm. This assumption, as shown 
in Petitioner's Brief ARGUMENT POINT I B, is without a reasonable 
basis. Therefore, Tandy's testimony will not support the court's 
finding that Bench relied on credible supporting evidence in 
making his determination that the two fire hydrants on the dead 
1. (R. 874, 11. 22-25);(R. 875, 1. 14 to 877, 1. 20);(R. 878, 1. 9 
to p. 881, 1. 2);(R. 881, 1. 11 to p. 882, 1. 9);(R. 898, 11. 
2-12);(R. 904, 11. 9-21);(R.907, 1. 10 to 908, 1. 5);(R. 911, 
1. 18 to 912, 1. 1). 
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end six-inch line created a system that is not adequate for safe 
fire fighting. 
vi. BENCH CLAIMED THAT THE CODE REQUIRES YOU TO OPERATE 
THE HYDRANT AT A MINIMUM OF 20 PSI BECAUSE YOU COULD 
CAVITATE OR COLLAPSE THE SYSTEM. HOWEVER, THIS 
REQUIREMENT CAN'T BE FOUND IN THE UFC. 
Rather than to duplicate what has already been stated in 
Petitioner Brief ARGUMENT, ISSUE I, A. b. in an effort to 
argue against cross-appellant's assertion that the evidence 
supports Bench's claim that the cross-appellee's system 
creates a danger of cavitating the pumper or collapsing the 
system, the cross-appellee directs this Court to cross-
appellee's brief. 
Both Tandy and Mertens agree to avoid a cavitation of the 
pumper or damage to the supply system, when pumping a quantity 
of water that is less than the pumping capacity of the pumper, 
the incoming pressure gauge mounted on the truck must be 
monitored at all times.1 The cross-appellant admits this is 
true, if you want to prevent the collapse and/or cavitation. 
See cross-appellants brief page 41. Furthermore, Mertens 
testified that if you properly monitor the incoming pressure 
gauge, any size pumper can hook onto any hydrant and pump 
whatever water is available. (R. 572, 1. 12 to R. 573, 1. 24). 
Because the cross-appellee pointed out that Bench admitted 
1. See (R. 894, 11. 4-11);(R. 569, 11. 8-18). 
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that his pumper truck had an incoming pressure gauge, but didn't 
know if it worked or whether it was accurate, and that none of 
his fire fighters were trained to operate the gauge, (R. 949, 11. 
2-17) the cross-appellant made the following ridiculous 
statement: 
"They must make do with what they have, an unreliable gauge 
and a volunteer fire department. While Petitioner argues 
that this is dangerous, it is the only system that was 
available to then Chief Bench." Cross-Appellant's Brief p. 
41. 
Bench's solution for a gauge, that doesn't work, is not to 
replace or repair the gauge, but is to require all of the cross-
appellee's hydrants to water flow 1,000 gpm to protect his two 
1,000 gpm rated pumpers. However, 1,000 gpm hydrants would not 
correct the problem that is caused by a gauge that doesn' t work, 
because 1,000 gpm rated pumpers can water flow up to 1,500 gpm. 
Supra. Furthermore, with a gauge that doesn't work, how would 
Bench use with safety the hydrants in town he said he did not 
trust, fearing that they could break if too much water was drawn 
from them. Bench said the following concerning these hydrants: 
"On the other side of the street, there was an old existing 
water and hydrant system. . . It was on an old four inch 
line. . . The town water superintendent told me from the 
very early goings in my being fire chief, that the water 
line and the hydrants on that side of the street were very 
poor. In fact, the line could not be trusted. It — could 
break if there was too much drown out of., those hydrants. 
And the . . hydrants later when we flowed them showed . . 
how poor they really were. They . . would not move the 
Pitot gauge at all. But I knew that those were bad 
hydrants, from day one." (R. 939-940). 
Concerning the poor hydrants, Mullen asked Bench, 
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"Q. But you told me you had a fire hydrant across the street 
that . . wouldn' t even register on the Pitot gauge, right? 
A. Correct. Q. And that's a hydrant for the Town of 
Springdale; correct? A. Not one I would use. (R. 543-544). 
However, the cross-appellant admitted in his foot note number ten 
on page 30 of his brief, that in fact Mr. Bench used the hydrant 
across the street to approve a permit for a T-shirt shop. If 
this hydrant was used with Bench's pumper with a gauge that 
didn't work, why wouldn't it cavitate his pumper or collapse the 
system? 
Concerning the statement made by Bench that none of his fire 
fighters have been trained on how to operate the gauge, Mr. 
Hathaway asked Mr. Mertens if it makes a difference if you have 
a trained fire fighting staff or an untrained one. Mr. Mertens 
said "no," reminding Mr. Hathaway that "there are requirements 
for fire department training." (R. 594, 11. 5-14) 
Bench claimed that the code requires you to operate the 
hydrant at a minimum of 20 psi because you could cavitate or 
collapse the system.1 However, this requirement can't be found 
in the UFC. 
On page 41-42 of Cross-Appellant's Brief, the cross-
appellant stated the following: 
"If, as Mr. Mertens testified, that 20 PSI is normally an 
accepted figure, regardless of the actual physics of when 
a system collapses or cavitates, then Chief Bench was 
justified in relying on the "normal accepted figure." 
1. See (R. 527, 1. 15 to 528, 1. 9);(R. 546, 1. 23 to 547, 1. 5) 
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However, the cross-appellant should have finished what Mertens 
said to understand if 20 PSI is necessary to keep a pumper from 
cavitating or a system from collapsing. The following is what 
Mertens testified to concerning this matter: 
Q. And do you agree that the . . minimum PSI that's 
acceptable under the UFC is 20 PSI in such a test? A. I 
don't recall that the 1988 version has 20 PSI in it. It's 
a normally accepted figure, regardless of whether it's in 
there. But if you look at the technical data behind it, it 
also says that you can go down to 10 pounds. And places do 
it to jfive pounds. But 20 pounds, to me, would be the 
acceptable figure. If I could not get 2,750 off of here at 
20 pounds, but I could at 15 pounds, I'd accept the system. 
Because the difference between 20 pounds with hydrants right 
next to a building is not going to make any difference at 
all. Because you're not going to loose that much pressure 
in your hose getting to the truck. Q. Would you accept 10? 
A. Yes, J would. (R. 638, 11. 13 to 639 11. 4). 
Furthermore, Mertens testified that maintaining 20 psi 
residual pressure in the supply system doesn't have anything to 
do with keeping pumpers from cavitating or the supply line from 
collapsing if the pressure drops below 20 psi. One reason that 
20 psi residual pressure is used, is that it gives you enough 
pressure to overcome all the hose that you connect to the hydrant 
in order to get water to your truck and to prevent the pressure 
dropping to low by the time you get to your truck. Pumpers are 
designed to suck under negative pressure. Therefore, before a 
pumper would cavitate, the inlet pressure would have to be less 
than zero. And before the pipes in the ground would ever 
collapse, it would have to take substantially less than zero 
pounds positive pressure. There's no reason why you couldn't 
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drop your pressure down to 5 to 10 psi while pumping. (R. 569-
571) . 
Tandy/ respondent's expert, said he did not know whether you 
could go below 20 PSI residual pressure in an emergency to fight 
a fire. He said that he was not an expert in this area. (R. 903 
11. 10-19). 
REGARDING FOOTNOTE #10 
In defense to cross-appellee's charge that Bench lied 
to the trial court, the cross-appellant said, 
"This is another instance where Petitioner claims Chief 
Bench lied to or tried to deceive the Court. Chief Bench 
had used the line across the street to approve a permit for 
a T-shirt shop, but did not want to depend on it for fire 
protection for the Indian Village complex. The evidence 
before the court was that this shop was quite small and 
would not have required the same amount of water flow or 
pressure to combat a fire as would the Indian Village 
complex, thus making it adequate for the fire protection of 
the t-shirt shop but inadequate for Indian Village, 
(emphasis added)(footnote 10). 
However, the evidence does not show that the T-shirt shop was 
quite small, but shows that the T-shirt shop was attached to 
the Zion Park motel complex. The square footage of the Zion Park 
complex requires 2,750 gpm water flow out of three hydrants, the 
same hydrant requirements the Indian Village complex was required 
to provide. Furthermore, the hydrant across the street water 
flowed only 400 gpm, (See Bench deposition Volume IV, Exhibit 
30 (diagram of Zion Park Complex) attached hereto as Exhibit XXA," 
which was used at trial at R. 960-963), this is the hydrant 
Bench said he would never use. (R. 543-544). 
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To try to save Bench's credibility the cross-appellant cited 
R. 986-987 for footnote number 10, wherein among other things, 
Hathaway asked Bench, 
"Q. Is that [T-shirt shop] 12,500 square feet? A. It was 
presented as — the plans that I reviewed were a small — 
a small building. Q. In fact, it's a few square feet? It's 
built in between existing buildings, is it not? A. Uh-hh. 
It was built between two existing buildings. 
The answers given by Bench are another example where Bench 
deliberately lied to the trial court. The T-shirt shop is not 
a "small building," "built between two existing buildings" but 
is a new building attached to two existing buildings making up 
the Zion Park complex which has more than 11,600 square feet in 
it and Bench knew this. See Bench deposition Volume IV, Exhibit 
30 (diagram of Zion Park Complex) attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
C. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE PETITIONER HAD FAILED 
COMPLETELY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE DECISION WAS BASED ON 
ANY WRONGFUL CONDUCT, PASSION, PARTIALITY, OR FRAUD. 
Bench's actions may be overturned if they were the 
result of wrongful conduct, passion, partiality or fraud. 
Even when the local officer's actions call for the exercise 
of his discretion, if he exercises that discretion in an 
extremely wrong or a flagrantly improper manner, his decision 
is reviewable and reversible. "[T]he action of an officer in 
a matter which calls for the exercise of his discretion or 
judgment will not be reviewed . . . unless . . . such action 
is shown to be extremely wrong or flagrantly improper and 
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unjust, so that the decision can only be explained as the 
result of caprice, passion or partiality." State v. 
Morehouse, 112 P. 169, 171 (Utah 1910)(emphasis added). As 
stated in another Utah Supreme Court opinion, although "an 
official act may be quasi-judicial or discretionary, yet if 
the discretion is qualified, and the refusal to perform the 
act is merely capricious, arbitrary, or wrongful, the officer 
may, nevertheless, be coerced by mandamus to do the act." 
Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bowman, 113 P. 63, 65 (Utah 
1911) (emphasis added). See also, Dillon v. Bd. Of Educ, 351 
S.E.2d 58, 59 (W.Va. 1986) ("Mandamus will lie to control a 
board of education in the exercise of its discretion upon a 
showing of caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary 
conduct, some ulterior motive, or misapprehension of the 
law.")(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, a discretionary decision made in bad faith 
also provides grounds to reverse the local official. See 
Chavez v. Sandia Corp., 555 P.2nd 699, 700 (N.M. 1976) (the 
district court properly limited its review to employers' 
administrative boardf s decision to whether the decision "was made 
in Jbad faith or was arbitrary or capricious." (emphasis added) 
As stated above, fraud also provides ground to review 
and reverse a local official's decision. See Bd. Of County 
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Commissioners v. Price, 385 P.2d 479, 482 (Okl. 1963)(where 
the local officer acts arbitrarily "or fraudulently, a writ 
of mandamus may be issued to require the performance of his 
duty")(emphasis added). See also, Mobile Oil Corp. v. 
McHenry, 200 Kan. 211, 436 P.2d 982, 996 (1968) (judicial 
interference is warranted when there is "fraud, corruption, 
and conduct so oppressive, arbitrary, or capricious as to 
amount to fraud . . . and the courts have power to relieve 
against all consequential injuries); Anderson v. Dunn, 180 
Kan. 811, 308 P.2d 154, 157 (1957)(when a public official's 
actions are tainted with fraud, or are so "capricious, 
arbitrary, or oppressive as to amount to constructive fraud, 
then the only avenue open to the aggrieved party is through 
some extraordinary legal remedy such as mandamus. ")(emphasis 
added). 
Finally, if "there has been such an abuse of discretion 
as to amount to no exercise of discretion at all, mandamus 
will lie to compel the proper exercise of powers granted." 
Crain v. Dept. Of Health & Environmental Sciences, 582 P.2d 
332, 334 (Mont. 1978). 
In Petitioner Brief, ARGUMENT, ISSUE II, are listed seven 
instances wherein Bench's actions as described, are suspect 
under virtually every category described above, including 
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lying. Thus, the very basis for Bench's subsequent decision 
if any, that the Indian Villages system was not safe for 
adequate fire fighting capabilities is highly suspect. 
D. CROSS-APPELLANT'S ISSUE II. D. DOES NOT LIST ANY 
EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT THAT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN ADDRESSED 
THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE COURTS FINDINGS COMPLAINED OF, SO 
NO FURTHER ANSWER IS WARRANTED. 
E. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING CERTAIN PIECES OF 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER. 
1. CROSS-APPELLEE ACCEPTS CROSS-APPELLANT'S STANDARD 
EMPLOYED BY THE COURTS IN DETERMINING THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE. 
2. RICK ROSENBERG'S TESTIMONY WAS EXCLUDED BY THE 
COURT. 
On page 48 of Cross-Appellant's Brief, the cross-
appellant said the following: 
"Mr. Mertens testified that he had seen the results from 
Mr. Rosenberg's simulation that such test showed it 
might be possible to get 1,500 GPM from hydrant three 
and based on these numbers and tests, the system was 
safe. 00566-00568. Even though Mr. Rosenberg himself 
did not testify to the results of the computer 
simulation, that information was before the Court. Mr. 
Rosenberg's testimony would have been duplicative. As 
Mr. Rosenberg's reports and the data contained were 
before the Court below, notwithstanding the Court's 
exclusion of Mr. Rosenberg, the Petitioner cannot argue 
that a different result would be obtained had Rosenberg 
testified. Hence, no substantial right has been 
affected in the Court's exclusion." 
However, the facts do not support these statements and 
conclusions for the following reason: 
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The only computer simulated tests that Mr. Mertens said 
he had seen are the following: 
(1) Two tests that showed fire hydrant #3 flowed more than 
1,500 gpm, and fire hydrant #2 flowed about 1,800 gpm, 
at 20 PSI, when each was flowing individually. (R. 
560, 1. 25 to 561, 1. 5) and, 
(2) one test that showed with fire hydrant #1 closed, and 
both fire hydrants #2 and #3 flowing, fire hydrant #3 
would water flow more than 800 g.p.m. and fire hydrant 
#2 would flow about 900 g.p.m. (R. 574, 1. 10 to 575, 
1. 16) . 
However, there was three other computer simulated water flow 
tests that Mr. Mertens did not see or testify about created on 
September 11, 1995, by Mr. Rosenberg that were made in an effort 
to duplicate the November 1, 1991, test results as Bench recorded 
them in him letter dated December 10, 1991. (R. 63). 
Mr. Mertens testimony was rebutted by Bench's testimony. (R. 
717, 11. 8-12). However, it is hard to impeach or argue with 
computer generated test results. If Mr. Rosenberg had been 
allowed to testify, he would have placed the various computer 
simulated test readouts he had created into evidence. Without 
Rosenberg to lay the foundation for the computer readouts, they 
could not have been placed into evidence. 
Mr. Rosenberg's testimony and the computer readouts 
certainly would not have been duplicative as argued by cross-
appellant. For example, Rosenberg would have testified as to 
how and why his computer could duplicate Bench's field test 
conducted on November 1, 1991, and various other scenarios. He 
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would have testified as to the kind of software program he used 
and to its margin of accuracy, in gallons per minute. 
Rosenberg's testimony and the simulated water flow test were 
critical to prove Bench's claim, that hydrant #2 and #3 could not 
water flow more than 1,100 gpm with hydrant #1 closed, was not 
based on a rational basis, and that his readings taken during 
the November 1, 1991, test had been falsified. This information 
was not before the court as argued by the cross-appellant. 
On page 47 of Cross-Appellant's Brief, the cross-
appellant said the following: 
"In its brief, Petitioner asserts for the first time that 
Mr. Rosenberg's testimony was offered to show that then 
Chief Bench had falsified the results of the November 1, 
1991, test. Upon review of the record, however, it is clear 
that this proffer was never made. Petitioner now asserts 
that Mr. Rosenberg's testimony would have established an 
element of fraud on then Chief Bench's part. . . Moreover, 
virtually all the witnesses who testified, including 
Petitioner's expert, Mr. Mertens, testified that the numbers 
and calculations in Al Bench's December flow test report 
were correct. Petitioner's assertions that the results have 
in some way been falsified are directly contrary to the 
evidence presented to the Court." (emphasis added). 
However, the facts do not support these statements and 
conclusions for the following reason: 
A. PETITIONER DID IN FACT OFFER MR. ROSENBERG'S 
TESTIMONY TO SHOW THAT BENCH FALSIFIED HIS NOVEMBER 
1, 1991, TEST EQUIPMENT READINGS. 
The following is taken from the record to show that the 
cross-appellee did in fact offer Rosenberg's testimony to 
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show that Bench had falsified the November 1, 1991, Test 
Equipment Readings: 
"MULLEN: Judge, there is one issue. And I want to alert 
the Court to it right now. I think that Mr. Tandy 
reopened the door to the computer expert . . . COURT: . 
. I don't think that the door's been opened to any 
additional evidence regarding the computer simulations. 
It seems to me we're still dealing with the information 
that was available to the chief on the day he made his 
decision. MULLEN: Judge, that's what we are saying. 
We're going to prove the information available to him 
could not have been what he put here, through that 
computer simulation. COURT: How are you going to do 
that? MULLEN: Because the simulation will show that if 
you put those figures in [and] the 43 PSI, you don't get 
those flows. COURT: But he didn't have the computer 
simulation. MULLEN: Well, Judge, it goes to his 
credibility as to what he said he measured after he put 
the gauge on it. COURT: Is there an issue as to what 
the gauge shows? MULLEN: Yes. . . HATHAWAY: The . . 
plaintiff has . . rested, as I see, first. COURT: 
That's true. HATHAWAY: And there is . . . no evidence 
before the Court rebutting those figures. There is no 
evidence that those figures were not correct. COURT: 
Well, the plaintiff has rested, but only after I refused 
to let . . their engineer testify as to the computer 
simulation. HATHAWAY: There's no further evidence, Your 
Honor, . . whatsoever that those numbers are inaccurate, 
or that the gauges are misread, or that . . the 
information gathered was wrong. There's been no 
evidence of that. MULLEN: Well, Your Honor, we would 
proffer that our simulation will show that. And that's 
what we proffered when we tried to get him on. (R. 919, 
1. 23 to 922. 1. 23) . 
B. THE COMPUTER SIMULATED TESTS THAT WERE REJECTED AS NOT 
RELEVANT WOULD HAVE PROVEN THAT BENCH DID NOT USE HIS 
TEST EQUIPMENT READINGS THAT WAS READ DURING THE 
NOVEMBER 1, 1991, WATER FLOW TEST TO CALCULATE THE 
TEST RESULTS AS REPORTED IN HIS LETTER DATED 
DECEMBER 10, 1991. 
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The computer simulated tests that were rejected as not 
relevant would have proven that Bench did not use his test 
equipment readings that were read during the November 1, 
1991, water flow test to calculate the test results as 
reported in his letter dated December 10, 1991. This 
conclusion is based on the following facts. 
(1) The test equipment readings Bench claimed he read 
during the test are as follows: 
a. Hydrant #1 read 30 psi on the pitot gauge on each 
of the two ports which were open. 
b. Hydrant #2 read 43 psi on the pressure gauge. 
c. Hydrant #3 read 6 psi on the pitot gauge on one 
of the ports which was open. 
(R. Ill, D-l). 
(2) Bench took the test equipment reading he claimed he 
read and computed those readings into gallons per 
minute and reported those results in his letter dated 
December 10, 1991. (R. 63). The reported results are 
as follows. 
a. Hydrant #1 flowed 2,120 gpm from two ports 
b. Hydrant #2 recorded 43 psi residual pressure. 
c. Hydrant #3 flowed 820 gpm from one port. 
(3) Rosenberg took two of the three reported readings in 
fact (2) above, and inputted those readings into his 
software program. Then the computer generated what 
the third reading should have been on a simulated flow 
test readout. 
(4) Rosenberg created three computer simulated tests to 
prove that regardless of which two readings reported 
by Bench were imputed into the computer the other 
reading generated by the computer was far from the 
reading reported by Bench, far outside the software's 
margin of error. 
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(5) After Rosenberg adjusting for the margin of accuracy 
for both the computer test and the field test, the two 
test results should have been very close. However 
they were so far apart that it was impossible for the 
results as Bench reported in his letter dated December 
10, 1991, to have come from his test equipment 
readings he claimed he read on November 1, 1991. 
(6) Fact number (3), (4), and (5) above, would have been 
established by Rosenberg's rejected testimony and 
readouts. 
Bench falsified the results of the water flow tests 
conducted on July 2, July 12, and October 16, 1991, to two Boards 
of Appeals. See Appellant's Brief, ISSUE II, f$ C and D) . The 
appellant proffered the testimony of Rosenberg to show among 
other things that the results of the flow test conducted on 
November 1, 1991, was also falsified. The testimony would have 
shown that the results of the test as reported by Bench were 
different than what was recorded on the test equipment. 
Therefore, considering the above facts there is a reasonable 
likelihood a different result would have been reached if 
Rosenberg's testimony and his computer simulated water flow test 
readouts had been placed into evidence. 
3. THE COURT ERRED BY SUSTAINING AN OBJECTION TO 
A QUESTION ASKED BENCH, WHETHER IT WAS TRUE 
THAT IN MARCH 1991, AT A FIRE BOARD MEETING, 
HE HAD AGREED THAT THE MINIMUM FLOW NEEDED FOR 
THE TWO HYDRANTS IN BACK WOULD BE 550 GPM. 
In a letter dated January 23, 1991, Elder ordered the 
Fire District to test hydrants #2 and #3 to determine 
if the water flow from hydrant #3 was insignificant while 
hydrant #2 was flowing, and if they found the flow of 
43 
hydrant #3 was insignificant the petitioner would have to 
"loop" its system. Supra. However, the letter did not state 
what the minimum hydrant #3 had to water flow before its flow 
was acceptable. 
In discovery the petitioner had been furnished an audio 
tape of the March 1991 Fire Board meeting. Mullen asked 
Bench, if it wasn't true that at this meeting, there had been 
a minimum of 550 g.p.m., agreed to which the back two 
hydrants needed to flow? This question was objected to as 
not being relevant and the objection was sustained. (R. 728, 
1. 8 to 729, 1. 14) . 
Concerning this matter, on page 48-49 of Cross-
Appellant's Brief, cross-appellant argued, 
"Had evidence been admitted that a discussion regarding 
the minimum flow for the back two hydrants had taken 
place at the March 1991 Fire Board Meeting, such 
evidence would still not be relevant. Even giving 
Petitioner the benefit of the doubt that such a 
discussion took place, such discussion, months earlier, 
had no bearing on the test administered and evidence 
'gathered on November l, 1991 or the conclusions reach as 
stated in the December m, lyyi, letter.™ (emphasis 
added). 
However, this argument is flawed for the following 
reasons: 
(1) P-81 was entered into evidence over the objection 
of Hathaway that it was not relevant. Because, it 
was a July 2, 1991, letter that reported the 
results of the water flow test conducted by John 
Elder on July 2, 1991, which the December 10, 1991, 
letter referenced in fact (4), below. (R. 497-
499)(R. Ill P-81). 
(2) P-92 was entered into evidence over the objection 
of Hathaway that it was not relevant. Because, it 
was a July 13, 1991, letter that gave the results 
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of the water flow test conducted by Bench on July 
12, 1991, which the December 10, 1991, letter 
referenced in fact (4), below. (R. 506-508) (R. Ill 
P-92). 
(3) P-209 was entered into evidence, because, it 
contained the results of the October 16, 1991, 
water flow test, which the December 10, 1991, 
letter referenced in fact (4), below. (R. 721-
722)(R. 112 P-209). 
(4) One of the conclusions reached by Bench and stated 
in the December 10, 1991, letter was, "Only 1,090 
gpm is available to the #2 and #3 hydrants on the 
dead end 6" line . . This reinforces the previous 
tests conducted by John Elder and myself which 
showed poor fire flow from those hydrants. The 
system is not adequate for safe fire fighting 
capabilities." (R. 63). 
(5) In all four water flow tests (see facts (1), (2), 
(3), and (4) above) the water flow from hydrants 
#2 and/or #3 exceeded 550 gpm, by more than 50%. 
See Petitioner's Brief, Statement of Facts II 20-
73T 
If at trial it had been established that Bench and the 
Fire Board had agreed that 550 gpm would be the minimum water 
flow hydrant #3 needed to flow, while hydrant #2 was flowing, 
for acceptable water flow, there is reasonable likelihood a 
different result would have been reached. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the petitioner requests 
this Court to find that the Fifth District Court did not err 
in denying Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and to reverse the 
Order of Dismissal dated December 12, 1995, and hold that the 
respondent ajbused his discretion when he concluded that the 
results of the water flow test conducted on November 1, 1991, 
showed that the water flow from petitioner's hydrants #2 and 
#3 was not adequate for safe fire fighting capabilities, or 
order a new trial. 
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DATED this _^~~"day of June 1996. 
Terry west 
The attorney for 
Petitioner/Appellant 
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